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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tion of an insurer's liability. Under the rule laid down in the instant case the
same liability can be found where the bailee promises to exercise the same
duty of care as is required by common law.
Most American courts hold that in bailments for mutual benefit a contract
of bailment is not to be construed to include- one of insurance by the bailee.
To hold otherwise is to rest liability upon incidental expressions of the com-
mon law duty of due care. Courts should not venture into uncertain grounds
to find liability where none was intended when justice and certainty in
contracts can so easily be had.
KIRK B. SAI1TH
CONTRACTS - ESTOPPEL - INFANTS - Plaintiff, 19 years of age, by rep-
resenting that he was 22, induced defendant, a loan company, to finance
the purchase of an automobile on conditional sale. Subsequently plaintiff
abandoned the automobile to defendant, repudiated the contract on the
ground of his minority, and brought this action to recover payments made.
Defendant counterclaimed for the unpaid balance on the contract after re-
possession and resale. The trial court rendered judgment for defendant on
his counterclaim and held that plaintiff, being of the age of discretion was
estopped to rescind the voidable contract because of his fraudulent repre-
sentations. Carney v. Southland Loan Co., 88 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1955).
An infant's contract,' except for the reasonable value of necessaries fur-
nished him, is voilable at his election.2 As a prerequisite to avoiding his
transaction he must return the specific consideration received, or any part
of it, which remains in his possession. 3 If he has disposed of or consumed
the consideration, by the weight of authority, he may nevertheless avoid the
contract and recover what he has parted with. 4 This privilege was founded
upon the necessity of protecting an infant from his own improvidence, and,
by forcing an adult to deal with infants at his peril, of protecting minors from
the designs of others. 5
Where an infant fraudulently misrepresents his age for the purpose of in-
ducing an adult to enter into a contract with him, the question arises whether
such an infant should be allowed to avoid his obligation without respon-
sibility either by liability in tort for his fraud or through estoppel.
Although an infant is generally liable for his torts,'; the English Courts7
and a few jurisdictions in the United States8 deny such responsibility where
the cause of action is based on a contract. It is reasoned that to enforce ,he
infant's liability for the tort would be an indirect means of enforcing his
1. At common law one is an infant until the day preceding his 21st birthday.
I Williston Contracts § 224 (rev. ed. 1936).
2. 1 Williston, Contracts §§ 223-240 (rev. ed. 1936). (As a general -rule an auto
is not considered a necessity.) 7 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice
§ 4438 (1950).
3. 1 Williston, contracts § 238 (rev. ed. 1936).
4. Ibid.
5. Burnand v. Erigoyen, 30 Cal.2d 861, 186 P.2d 417, 420 (1947) (dictum).
6. Prosser, Torts 1085, 1086 (1941).
7. E.g., Bartlett v. Wells, 1 Best and S. 836, 121 Eng.Rep. 924 (1862). Johnson v.
Pie, I Lev. 169, 83 Eng.Rep. 353 (1665).
8. E.g., Monumental Building Assoc. v. Herman, 33 Md. 128 (1870); Ray6sond v.
General Motorcycle Sales Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N.E. 359 (1918); Slayton v. Barry,
175 Mass. 513, 56 N.E. 574 (1900); Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C.
109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923).
RECENT CASES
liability on the contract. A majority of the United States Courts hold the
infant liable on the theory that the action is one purely in tort, independent
of the contract. 0
The general rule, in the absence of statute,1 0 is that the doctrine of
estoppel has no application to infants." In other jurisdictions
12 including
the State of Georgia,13 the courts have not strictly adhered to this rule and
have held that fraudulent misrepresentations by the infant regarding his
majority will estop him from setting up his disability where the other party
to the contract has acted in good faith and without negligence.
Modem conditions have brought infants into trade and commerce to an
extent not contemplated when the common law doctrine regarding infancy
originated. In attempting to promote greater freedom in commercial tran-
sactions and in recognizing that most infants who are artful enough to suc-
cessfully practice (such subterfuge as fraud) are also of sufficient intelli-
gence to be charged with the contractual responsibilities of their deceit,
many courts have devised different theories to hold the infant responsible.
Some states hold the infant liable in tort for his fraud in the inducement of
the contract 14 while others apply the doctrine of estoppel to preclude his
plea of minority.' 5 Some courts allow the infant to rescind but require him
to reimburse the seller for depreciation and use of the property while in his
possession.'" Still others by statute, require an infant above the age of 18
years to restore the consideration or its value as a condition precedent to
rescission.
17
The result of the instant case, although following the minority view,
appears preferrable in the light of reason and logic since it prevents the
shield of infancy from being used as a sword.
WALTER AURAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - RIGHT OF FREE Associ-
ATION AND RIGHT TO WORK LAWS* - On suit of plaintiff non-union railroad
employees, the District Court enjoined the defendant railroad and defendant
labor organizations from executing union shop agreements permitted by, the
9. E.g., Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 420 (1886); Wisconsin Loan & Finance
Corp. v. Goodnough, 201 Wisc. 101, 228 N.W. 484 (1930).
10. E.g., Iowa Code § 599.3 (1950), Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., 192 Ia. 427,
185 N.W. 32 (1921); Kansas Gen.Stat. § 38-103 (1949), Dillian v. Burnham,
43 Kan. 77, 22 Pac. 1016 (1890); Wash. Rev. Stat. § 5830 (1922); Thosaath v. Trans-
port Motor Co., 136 Wash. 565, 240 Pac. 921 (1925).
11. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927); Simo v. Everhardt, 102 U.S.
300, 313 (1880) (dictum).
12. E.g., County Board of Education v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S.W. 63 (1912);
Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921); LaRosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L.
375, 105 AtI. 201 (1918); Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 17 S.W.2d 8 (1929).
13. Clemens v. Olshine, 54 Ga.App. 290, 187 S.E. 711 (1936); Hood v. Duren,
33 Ga. App. 203, 125 SE. 787 (1924).
14. See not 9 supra.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927); Murdock v. Fisher Finance
Corp., 51 Cal.App. 372, 251 Pac. 319 (1926).
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 35-37, Murdock v. Fisher Finance Corp., 51 Cal.App. 372,
251 Pac. 319 (1926); N.D. Rev. Code § 14-1011 (1943), In Re Campbells Guardianship.
56 N.D. 60, 215 N.W. 913 (1927); Easement v. Callaghan, 35 N.D. 27, 159 N.W. 77
(1916); S.D. Code § 43.0105 (1939).
* Subsequent to the preparation of this paper, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted an appeal to the defendants in this case. As yet, no decision has been
rendered by them.
